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INTRODUCTION
What else can public corporations do for women and people of
color? What else can attorneys for women and people of color do
to serve those clients better? Many goals have been suggested
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and advanced including (1) equal pay for equal work, (2) equal
opportunity, (3) special consideration in light of history, biology,
and special circumstances, (4) various forms of affirmative action,
and (5) reparations for past wrongs, to mention a few. Many of
these have been advanced not only as moral or ethical
propositions, but as “win-win” opportunities not only for women
and people of color, but also for corporations and shareholders as
well. The italicized “else” in the two introductory questions set
forth above seeks to identify additional opportunities rarely
advanced or considered.
One of the most important duties of lawyers is to assist
clients in identifying and securing their essential rights,
responsibilities, and opportunities. One of the purposes of legal
education is to assist lawyers, clients, and society in identifying
and securing essential rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.
In the light of this duty and purpose, this Article describes
one opportunity rarely suggested by counsel that may offer to
people of color, women, public corporations, and their
shareholders benefits far beyond the conventional wisdom and
far greater than can be expected based on the mainstream
economic theories (classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian)
generally relied upon in formulating and evaluating plans and
opportunities.
The opportunity is to secure for growing numbers, and
eventually all women and people of color, the right to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital.1 This is a right presently
enjoyed by all well-capitalized people, which, of course, includes
some women and people of color, but only a small minority of
them.
To understand why this right, which is called “the binary
property right,” may be of singular importance to women and
people of color, and also to essentially all poor and working
people, and why its realization may also be in the interest of
public corporations and most, if not all, of their shareholders, it is
necessary for counsel for women and people of color to learn some
1 As used in binary theory, capital refers to all non-human factors of production
that can be owned. Thus it includes land, animals, tools, machines, structures,
patents, copyrights, and other intangibles—anything capable of being owned and
producing wealth and therefore income. Capital does not include what is sometimes
called “financial capital,” which binary economics analyzes as a participation in the
earnings of capital (i.e., a property right in capital). Furthermore, capital does not
include “human capital,” which binary economics analyzes as a function of labor.

CP1_ASHFORD

2005]

2/6/2006 9:10:03 PM

MEMO ON BINARY ECONOMICS

1223

basic principles of a little-understood theory of economics called
“binary economics.” Binary economics offers a conception of
economics that is foundationally distinct from the economic
theories presently employed by government, private enterprise,
charitable foundations, policy institutes, individuals, and their
counsel to formulate and evaluate economic policy.2
As explained more fully below, according to binary
economics, instituting the binary property right is beneficial to
women and people of color because it will over time greatly
enhance their earning power and autonomy by supplementing
their labor income and/or welfare benefits increasingly with their
earnings from capital ownership. Instituting the binary property
right will also benefit public corporations and their shareholders
because it will provide a stable, growing, broadening, productionbased consumer demand that will enable public corporations to
2 Binary Economics was first advanced by the corporate finance attorney,
investment banker, and philosopher, Louis Kelso. See generally LOUIS O. KELSO &
MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); LOUIS O. KELSO &
PATRICIA H. KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP
REVOLUTION (1986); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NEW CAPITALISTS:
A PROPOSAL TO FREE ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM THE SLAVERY OF SAVINGS (1961);
LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, TWO-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF
REALITY (1967). The authoritative and most complete source of writings by Louis
Kelso can be found on the website of The Kelso Institute. The Kelso Institute,
http://www.kelsoinstitute.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
In recent years, binary economics has become a subject of inquiry within the
socio-economic approach to law-related economic issues championed by the Section
on Socio-Economics of the Association of American Law Schools at its Annual
Meeting Programs. See The Journal of Law and Socio-Economics,
http://www.journaloflawandsocioeconomics.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
The author has published other works discussing binary economics as a distinct
paradigm. See generally ROBERT ASHFORD & RODNEY SHAKESPEARE, BINARY
ECONOMICS: THE NEW PARADIGM (1999); Robert Ashford, The Binary Economics of
Louis Kelso: A Democratic Private Property System for Growth and Justice, in
CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW ROLE OF PROPERTY 99–100 (John H. Miller ed.,
1994), available at http://www.cesj.org/binaryeconomics/binary-cwp1ed.pdf; Robert
Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso: The Promise of Universal Capitalism,
22 RUTGERS L.J. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Ashford, The Promise of Universal
Capitalism]; Robert Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy, 25 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS
1 (1996) [hereinafter Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy]; Robert Ashford, A
New Market Paradigm for Sustainable Growth: Financing Broader Capital
Ownership with Louis Kelso’s Binary Economics, 14 PRAXIS: FLETCHER J. DEV.
STUD. 25 (1998); Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and
Corporate Social Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization
and Distribution for Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531
(2002) [hereinafter Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate
Social Responsibility].
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employ their existing productive capacity more fully and
profitably as well as invest more profitability to achieve greater
growth.
To acquire capital with the earnings of capital, wellcapitalized people use: (1) the pre-tax earnings of capital, (2)
collateral, (3) credit, (4) insurance and markets to diversify and
reduce risk, and (5) a monetary policy intended to protect private
property.
The same institutions and practices that work
profitably for well-capitalized people can also work profitably for
all people. Moreover, in an economy operating at less than full
capacity, if capital can competitively pay for its acquisition costs
out of its future earnings primarily for existing owners, it can do
so even more profitably if all people are included in the capital
acquisition process.
Binary economic analysis combines the salient principles of
the following: (1) the Homestead Acts, which were intended to
broaden land ownership, (2) the employee stock ownership plan
(“ESOP”) technique of corporate finance, which uses tax exempt
limited liability trusts, as fiduciary agents for employees, to
acquire shares of employer stock with non-recourse credit, (3) a
market for capital credit insurance, such as that profitably
provided by the Federal Housing Administration, and (4) a
return of the Federal Reserve to its original Congressional
mandate under Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act to broaden
access to capital credit by discounting of eligible productive
private credit.
Binary economic analysis offers an entirely voluntary means
that would enable major prime credit-worthy companies to meet
any portion of their capital requirements while simultaneously
enabling their employees, customers, neighbors, and others to
acquire shares in participating corporations with non-recourse
credit, and pay for those shares with the earnings of the capital
acquired. The acquired shares would be full-dividend shares of
the participating companies. The shares would distribute their
full return (net of reserves for depreciation, research, and
development to maintain the competitive productive capacity of
the capital) first to pay the cost of capital acquisition and then to
provide a capital source of income to supplement wages and
welfare benefits.
When representing women and people of color regarding
their economic interests, counsel should not limit the scope of
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their representation to exclude advocacy of the right to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital without their clients’
informed consent.
I. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF CORPORATE WEALTH AND
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Before presenting an overview of binary economics and how
it may be used to persuade corporations to act to realize for
women and people of color the binary property right to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital, it would be appropriate to
consider briefly corporate wealth, fiduciary duties, and social
responsibility.
As a creature of the state, with strong persona status, the
public corporation has special advantages for profitably
organizing the mix of input factors necessary for wealth creation
and distribution on a massive scale. Indeed, the development of
corporate law is both a response to, and facilitation of, modern
economic enterprise. It reflects and shapes economic behavior.
Major corporations dominate the emerging global economy
and the economy of virtually every nation. In terms of productive
capacity, capital ownership, jobs, and environmental impact,
major corporations tell much of the story regarding economic
activity. America’s three thousand largest corporations, for
example, own over ninety percent of the investable assets in the
United States (excluding residential real estate).3
But not all people are able to participate effectively in the
ownership and capital acquisition of those corporations. The
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) reports that its listed
securities are owned directly or indirectly by over fifty million
shareholders, but the median shareholder is forty-three years old
with a portfolio of less than $15,000 in value.4 Thus, the
distribution of common share ownership is a bit like the river
that is two miles wide but mostly a few inches deep. In the
United States, for example, in approximate terms, 1% of the
people through their direct and indirect share holdings own 40–
3 Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (2002).
4 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK ONLINE, HIGHLIGHTS OF NYSE
SHAREOWNER CENSUS REPORTS (1952–1990), http://www.nysedata.com/factbook
(follow “The Investing Public” hyperlink; then follow “Highlights of NYSE
shareowner census reports (1952–1990)” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
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50% of the marketable securities; 10% of the people own 90%; the
remaining 90% of the people own the remaining 10% of
marketable securities; and of that 90%, over half the people own
none.5
At the same time: almost all capital is owned by major
corporations; almost all capital owned by those corporations is
acquired with the earnings of capital; much of it is acquired with
borrowed money; and all is acquired with the indispensable
foundation consisting of a stable property, monetary, credit, and
market system dependent on government regulation,
maintenance, protection, and enforcement. In the case of major
prime credit-worthy companies in the United States, the sources
of funds for capital acquisition, in approximate terms, are as
follows: 70% with retained earnings, 23% with debt, and 7% with
direct issuance of shares of stock.6 Relatively little capital is
acquired with the earnings of labor. The vast majority of people
in every nation have little or no participation in the capital
acquisition of the world’s major corporations.
The primary purpose of corporate finance is to enable
corporations to acquire capital before they have earned the
money to pay for it. Under the prevailing system of corporate
finance, as corporate assets grow and are continually used to buy
additional assets with their earnings, they benefit people
primarily in proportion to existing wealth. Under this approach,
the rich benefit the most, the middle class benefit less, and the
poor (“the least of these”) benefit least of all. Looking at the
economy as a whole, the system offers (1) growing capital
ownership and most of the best jobs to the well-capitalized, (2)
the remaining jobs and welfare to others, and (3) goods and
services to anyone with money or credit to buy them, while the
negative effects of corporate production are “externalized” so that
they are borne, to the extent possible, by persons other than the
corporation and perhaps its privileged investors and employees.
Those who own little or nothing are offered jobs, welfare, and
5 See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY
WEALTH IN AMERICA 11–12 (1995) [hereinafter WOLFF, TOP HEAVY]; Edward N.
Wolff, How the Pie is Sliced: America’s Growing Concentration of Wealth, AM.
PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 58 [hereinafter Wolff, How the Pie is Sliced].
6 See RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE (2d ed. 1984); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 613, 648 (1988).
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cheaper products as their participation in economic growth, but
they are effectively denied the governmental policies that assist
well-capitalized owners in acquiring additional capital with the
earnings of capital.
According to many, the advantages of doing business in the
corporate form, the sheer size and impact of large corporations on
society, and the attendant concentration of wealth and power call
for a corporate social responsibility toward those affected by the
corporation that may, in particular contexts, override the
fiduciary responsibility to the corporation’s existing shareholders.
Clearly governments can and do create opportunities for, and
impose obligations on, corporations that have distributional and
redistributional consequences. Beyond obligations specified by
law and regulation, what is required of corporations and
corporate fiduciaries? In terms relevant to corporate social
responsibility, the question can be expressed as follows: in
setting the wealth maximization and distribution goals of the
corporation, what other interest(s), beyond the interests of the
residual claimants, who are usually common shareholders, that
relate to other stakeholders—employees, customers, suppliers,
neighbors, and others including flora, fauna, and the
environment—may, should, or must corporate fiduciaries take
into account? Thus, the debate regarding the existence and scope
of corporate social responsibility can be cast as a debate
regarding duties of corporate fiduciaries with respect to the
maximization and distribution of wealth owned by the
corporation and the opportunities available to the corporation.
II. OVERVIEW OF BINARY ECONOMICS
Binary economics can be distinguished from other economic
schools by three related propositions:
(1) Labor and capital are “independent” or “binary”
factors of production; or in other words, they are
“independently productive”;
(2) Technology makes capital much more productive than
labor; and
(3) Capital has a strong, positive distributive relationship
to growth such that the more broadly capital is acquired,
(a) the more it can be profitably employed to increase
output, and (b) the more an economy (and major
corporations within the economy) will profitably grow.

CP1_ASHFORD

1228

2/6/2006 9:10:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1221

According to the binary view of production, although labor
and capital may cooperate, just as people may cooperate, to do
work, each factor, the human and the non-human, provides its
own “independent productiveness.”
In this context, it is
important to distinguish between “productivity,” which is the
ratio of the output of all factors of production, divided by the
input of one factor, usually labor, and “productiveness,” which
retrospectively means “work done” and prospectively means
“productive capacity.”
According to Adam Smith, the primary role of capital is to
increase labor productivity.7 Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall (widely
credited for neoclassical economics), and J.M. Keynes did not
disagree.8 Indeed, in his General Theory, Keynes distilled the
economy to three fundamental variables—time, money, and
labor—and treated capital as a dependent variable.9 In binary
economics, (1) capital and labor are equally fundamental,
independent (i.e., binary) variables and (2) the primary role of
capital is to replace and vastly supplement the work of labor
(“labor productiveness”) with the work of capital (“capital
productiveness”).
The “independent productiveness” of labor and capital can be
illustrated by considering the work of digging holes and hauling
sacks. A person can dig a hole in four hours by hand and in one
hour with a shovel (capital). According to mainstream economic
analysis, with a shovel, labor productivity increases by a factor of
four. But from a binary perspective, per hole, with the shovel,
labor is contributing only twenty-five percent of its former
productiveness, and the shovel is contributing seventy-five
percent. The independent productiveness of capital is more
clearly revealed in the work of hauling sacks: a person can haul
one sack, one mile, in one hour and is exhausted. In the same
time, with a horse, ten sacks can be hauled four times as far,
yielding a forty-fold increase in output, and with a truck, five
hundred sacks can be hauled forty times as far, yielding a twenty
thousand-fold increase in output. The horse and truck are doing
7 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 332 (photo. reprint 1981) (Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
8 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 213–17 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1964) (1936); KARL
MARX, CAPITAL 188 (Friedrich Engels ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952)

(1887).
9 See KEYNES, supra note 8, at 213–14.
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essentially all of the extra work.
Based on its independent productiveness, capital has six
powers that are important to production and growth. Capital
can:
(1) replace labor by doing what was formerly done by
labor;
(2) vastly supplement the work of labor by performing
much more of the kind of work that humans can do;
(3) do work that labor alone can never do (e.g., elevators
lift tons thousands of feet in the air; airplanes fly;
scientific instruments unleash forces that create computer
chips that cannot be made by hand; fruit trees make fruit
while all farmers can do is assist in the process);
(4) work without labor, as in the case of washing
machines, windmills, automatic tellers, robots, and fruit
trees;
(5) pay for itself out of its future earnings (the basic rule
of business investment); and
(6) distribute the income necessary to purchase its output
(the logic of double-entry book-keeping).
The first four powers concern what might be considered the “real
economy” powers of capital; the latter two are powers that are
most clearly revealed in a private property, market economy with
a stable credit system protected by a reliable legal system.
Each of these powers of capital contributes to the growth,
including mere labor replacement, which produces the same
physical output while liberating the time of workers for other
activity including leisure. However, only the first power directly
involves the mere substitution of capital for labor. Thus,
although some economists, teachers of law and (neoclassical)
economics, and policy advocates use the marginal efficiency
theory of neoclassical economics as the foundation for a general
theory of growth,10 the capital/labor substitution process is only
one component of growth, operating after the creation of greatly
10 See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 252 (6th ed. 2003).
“What Adam Smith referred to as a nation’s wealth, what this book refers to as
efficiency, and what a layman might call the size of the pie, has always been an
important value . . . .” For a critique of this approach on positive and ethical
grounds, see Robert Ashford, Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities in
Teaching Law-Related Economic Issues, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 150-52 (2004);
see also James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics,
and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW AND HISTORY REV.
275 (1997).
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increased productive capacity.
Moreover, from the binary
perspective, the wealth enhancing contribution to efficient
pricing and resource allocation is severely limited so long as the
distribution of capital acquisition remains narrow.11
When analyzing how production and productive capacity
have grown since the publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations in
1776, mainstream market economics interprets the role of capital
as merely facilitative: capital increases human productivity,
thereby allowing for a rise in output per unit of labor input,
higher wages, and the employment of more labor. According to
binary economics, in contributing to economic growth, capital
does much more than increase the productivity of the humans
who work with it. Increasingly, capital is doing a growing
portion of the total work. Thus, economic growth is primarily the
result of increasing capital productiveness rather than increasing
labor productivity. The economic imperative is generally to
produce more with more productive capital and less labor.
Therefore, although capital may be seen to concentrate higher
productivity into fewer workers, as the general rule, per unit of
output and in the aggregate, the primary effect of technological
advance is to make capital more productive than labor and
thereby to replace and vastly supplement the productiveness of
labor with ever greater capital productiveness.
Moreover, capital works on both sides of the productionconsumption economic equation by providing vastly increasing
productive capacity and production, and capacity to distribute
income and leisure. According to binary economists, in a private
property, market economy, it is the capacity of capital to do much
11 Frequently, neoclassical economists stress that prices determine distribution,
but less frequently teach that distribution also determines prices. So long as most
people own little or no capital, most consumer goods and services will be worth the
work people are willing to do by their labor to acquire them. This is (1) how Adam
Smith and John Maynard Keynes saw it, (2) the foundation of price theory, and (3)
in an economy in which capital ownership is highly concentrated, empirically the
“labor theory of value” in practice. However, in an economy in which ownership is
much more broadly distributed, the value of goods and services is not limited to the
work people are willing and able to do by way of their labor, but also includes the
work they are willing and able to let their capital do. Based on human effort alone,
few sacks are “worth hauling” before the hauler becomes exhausted. With a horse,
many more sacks are worth hauling; and the economy of sack-hauling will grow as
horse (and truck) ownership becomes more broadly distributed. Thus, people
express value not only by the work they do but also by the work they let their capital
do. This is another expression of the principle of binary growth. See generally
ASHFORD & SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2.
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more work and to distribute much more income and leisure that
explains how the broader distribution of its ownership has a
positive impact on the fuller employment of productive capacity,
capital accumulation, and growth.
III. THE QUESTION OF UNUTILIZED PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
When assisting clients to identify and secure their essential
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities, it is important for
lawyers to identify relevant issues helpful to clients that have
been left out of the discussion. From a binary perspective, with
regard to the interests of women and people of color, one of the
most important issues generally left out of the discussions on
corporate governance, fiduciary duties, and social responsibility
is the question of unutilized productive capacity (“UPC”).
The recognition that an economy has (or may have) a
substantial amount of UPC significantly alters the moral and
practical content of the debate on economic policy. If people
languish in deprivation in a context where there is no unused
capacity to produce more, then apart from charity, the moral
question is whether it is right to compel the redistribution from
the richer Peter to support the poorer Paul; and the practical
question is whether such compulsory redistribution will
positively or negatively affect the amount of future production
available to Peter and Paul.
But if people languish in
deprivation, when the capacity to produce more does exist, then
as a practical matter, Paul can at least in theory be enriched
without compulsory redistribution from Peter; and it is
incumbent on counsel, other fiduciaries, and all people of good
will to question the adequacy of existing economic approaches to
productive capacity and to look for better approaches to economic
policy related to productive capacity. Thus, binary economists
believe that by focusing attention on the question of UPC,
attorneys for economically disadvantaged people will be better
able to serve their clients.
There are, of course, different definitions of unutilized
productive capacity depending upon the purpose of economic
inquiry, and lawyers must carefully consider which definition or
definitions will best serve the interests of their clients.
Mainstream economic analysis generally employs a narrow and
frequently documented “static” approach to UPC that focuses
primarily on existing assets and available labor at a given wage.
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The presently unemployed portion of each existing or available
factor is the “static UPC” for that factor.
In considering the question of UPC, however, a corporate
fiduciary cannot think merely in terms of existing capital and
available labor. A definition of unutilized capacity which looks
only to existing assets and available labor is a limited conception
that ignores the competitive and wealth-enhancing implications
of advancing technology, major capital investment, changes in
skills, preferences, and environmental factors and a broader
pattern of capital acquisition over time.
This broader
timeframe—in which technology, major capital investment,
skills, preferences, environmental factors, and ownership
distribution are variable—is an essential foundation for much of
the corporate planning required of corporate fiduciaries.12 Such a
timeframe is certainly not the exclusive domain of neoclassical
economic analysis, which generally holds technology, skills,
preferences, environmental factors, and major capital investment
constant and ignores the distribution of ownership.
Thus, from the perspective of corporations and corporate
fiduciaries, a central question is: What business strategy should
be pursued to most profitably acquire, employ, and dispose of
corporate assets over time? With respect to those assets, if any
substantial amount of unutilized productive capacity exists and
could be profitably employed, corporate profits and shareholder
wealth would increase accordingly.
The question of unutilized capacity is also a central issue for
people concerned about the welfare of economically
disadvantaged people and for government policymakers vested
with a responsibility in matters of economic welfare. When there
is unutilized productive capacity of an economy’s major
corporations, there is a capacity to provide more basic necessities,
such as food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and healthcare,
and simple comforts and conveniences by way of greener and
more socially responsible industrial processes and practices.13
The ever-present threat of plant closings, downsizing, and layoffs
can be understood as a reflection of unutilized productive
capacity. Many economic assaults on the environment resulting
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
See Ashford, supra note 3, at 1203; Robert Ashford, Binary Economics and the
Case for Broader Ownership 4, available at http://www.globaljusticemovement.org/
subpages_online_library/ashford1.pdf (July 20, 2003).
12
13
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from destructive production technologies (that continue despite
the know-how to ameliorate or replace them with greener
technologies that people cannot afford), can be understood as
reflections of unutilized productive capacity.
As in the case of corporate fiduciaries acting in the corporate
interest, it is in the interest of women and people of color (and
the duty of their attorneys, other advocates, and advisors) to
focus on the question of unutilized productive capacity in the
broader, what could be called “holistic,” sense that reflects the
real potential to produce and distribute goods and services on a
sustainable basis over time. Thus, in the remainder of this
Article, unless otherwise specifically noted, “unutilized
productive capacity” includes static UPC and also the broader
holistic, fiduciary understanding of UPC.
To some people, the question of the existence of unutilized
productive capacity, in the broader, holistic sense of the term,
may be simply a matter of opinion. But in law, like the question
of valuing a company, it is also a question of fact.
Taking the assumed perfect efficiency or approximate perfect
efficiency of markets as the best starting point for economic
analysis, some people believe that a major economy like that of
the United States and major prime credit-worthy companies
within the economy have little or no unutilized productive
capacity. “If there were an appreciable amount of unutilized
productive capacity,” they argue “it would surely be employed.
This is what rational people acting with a profit motive do, and if
people refuse to act rationally in this way they will be driven out
of business by others who do.” But in my experience, many more
people do not believe that markets are that efficient and instead
believe that there is substantial and growing unutilized
productive capacity.
On this point, a simple thought experiment might be
illuminating. Suppose you were king or queen of the world and
could ordain any economic policy as the law of the world, and
your goal were to feed, clothe, and shelter the world, and provide
people with the resources to develop themselves to their highest
good. Although you might fall short of your desired goal, would it
be easier to approach your goal now than one hundred, two
hundred, or three hundred years ago? And, to change the
hypothetical, if you were still the king or queen of the world and
(just as the Pharaohs loved pyramids) you love unutilized
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productive capacity. It is not enough for you to have two closed
manufacturing plants in a particular locale (with the lost jobs
gone to manufacturers overseas where wages do not internalize
such factors as health and retirement benefits, safety and
environmental standards, military costs, and infrastructural
benefits of the United States); instead, you prefer to have seven
more such plants. Would it be easier to build seven such
unutilized plants today than one, two, or three hundred years
ago?
Thus, if asked to determine the facts with due diligence, I
predict that the general counsel of most prime credit-worthy
companies would, after consulting with all appropriate experts,
conclude that their companies, even as they determine the need
to effect major downsizings, plant closings, and lay-offs, owned
the productive capacity with available capital assets and labor to
profitably increase output by perhaps 10–20%, or more, at lower
unit costs if there were only the customers with money to buy
what could be readily produced. This would apply not only to
consumer goods but also to producer goods, so that within
existing unutilized productive capacity, there is the capacity to
create even more unutilized productive capacity.
Of course, not everyone would agree with my prediction,
which is based on experience and anecdotal evidence but no
scientific validation. Nevertheless, a lesson from economic
history and the history of economic thought may be instructive.
In the Great Depression of the 1930s, society was faced with a
major anomaly that politically could not be ignored: the anomaly
of vast unutilized productive capacity, even in the limited static
sense, alongside widespread need and want among willing and
able, but unemployed people.14 It was a time when passenger
trains rolled by with few passengers able to pay the fares, and
freight trains rolled by empty of freight, but carrying people who
were traveling the country looking for work. The persistence of
unutilized productive capacity at that time, and the failure of
classical and neoclassical theory to provide government and
society with a satisfactory theoretical explanation or practical
solution for the anomaly provided the political foundation for the
recognition of Keynesian economics as a mainstream school of

14

Ashford, supra note 13, at 2.
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thought.15
Unlike the 1930s, presently unutilized productive capacity is
not explicitly a major focus of mainstream economic and political
analysis. Generally, people do not get funding, prizes, or much
recognition for addressing the question of unutilized productive
capacity. As a policy issue, UPC rarely enters the mainstream
discussion. Yet in ways important to corporate profitability,
more unutilized productive capacity seems to exist now than in
the 1930s. In my experience, most people believe that the
western-style capitalist economies could more nearly feed, clothe,
and shelter all the world’s people today than in 1935, despite
substantial population growth since then. Although today’s
percentages of static UPC may be far smaller than the
percentages that prevailed in 1935, most people I know believe
that in the fuller, holistic sense of the term, the unutilized
productive capacity of major corporations today is far greater
than it was during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Despite
neoclassical assumptions of rising costs and diminishing returns,
much of the unused productive capacity is generally marked by
diminishing unit costs and increasing economies of production
made unprofitable only by insufficient consumer demand even at
discount prices.
Again learning from history, comparing the political climate
during the 1930s to the political climate today, it seems most
reasonable to conclude that when the existence of substantial
unutilized productive capacity is undeniable, the interests of the
economically disadvantaged become matters of much greater
concern to the government, private foundations, major economic
players in the economy, and the electorate.
So if the question of unutilized productive capacity is of
importance to economically disadvantaged people, and also to the
interests of major corporations, attorneys for economically
disadvantaged people should ask:
(1) “Why is unutilized
productive capacity not a major part of the present discussion?,”
and (2) “How can unutilized productive capacity be included in
the discussion in a way that works for the benefit of economically
disadvantaged people?”
15 See Bill Gerrard, Keynes, The Keynesian and the Classics: A Suggested
Interpretation, 105 ECON. J. 445, 449 (1995) (characterizing the central theoretical
task of Keynesian economics as explaining the outcome of persistent
underemployment).
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Unfortunately, mainstream economics has no coherent
position on unutilized productive capacity in the holistic sense.
Rather than consensus, it provides controversy. It is not even
clear that mainstream economics has a non-controversial way of
measuring holistic unutilized productive capacity. Thus, on the
authority of economic theory, there is no sound basis to dismiss
the controversy regarding unutilized productive capacity merely
by arguing that reformers have the burden of proving the
existence of unutilized productive capacity in the holistic sense of
the term.
In fact, mainstream economics fragments into different
schools on the existence, extent, and significance of unutilized
productive capacity and what to do about it. These schools offer
different guidance to private corporations and public
policymakers.
Neoclassical economics assumes perfect
competition and efficiency as the starting point of analysis.16 In
the world of perfect neoclassical efficiency, unutilized capacity,
beyond the need for peaks in market demand and an insurance
for emergencies beyond the predictable, is an anomaly that
should not persist for long. In efficient markets, unproductive
assets are sold, even at salvage if necessary. Even before they
become partially or totally unutilized, assets not earning
competitive returns for their owners are sold to those whose rate
of return can be enhanced by the acquisition.17 Moreover,
according to neoclassical economics, “as markets become more
competitive, unutilized productive capacity should decrease, not
increase.”18 For those who believe that this logic describes the
ongoing reality experienced in a national economy, there is little
or no sustained unutilized capacity beyond the amount that is
efficient to maintain.19 Plant closings, downsizings, and lay-offs
are signs of greater, not less, efficiency. For those who believe

16 See Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 540–41 (1998) (describing the perfect competition
model of neoclassical economics). See generally Joan Robinson, What is Perfect
Competition?, 49 Q. J. ECON. 104 (1934).
17 Ashford, supra note 3, at 1202.
18 Id.
19 The history that gave rise to the antitrust laws reveals, however, that vast
unutilized capacity can also be of great value to a rational, self-interested monopolist
because it discourages potential competitors from investing the resourses to
compete. Those enjoying monopoly profits are of course benefited if the existence of
unutilized capacity never enters the discussions of economic policy.
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markets are efficient or nearly efficient, there is little or no
unutilized productive capacity (including little or no involuntary
labor unemployment) that exists by reason of the market’s failure
to distribute sufficient demand for goods and service.
But to most observers, these conclusions are belied by
experience. From many people, I have heard claims that today
there is a growing technological capacity to feed, clothe, and
shelter the world if there were only sufficient income to buy what
can be readily produced. However close to the truth such a claim
is in the year 2005, it was less true in 1905, and still less true in
1805.
Based on a conception that confuses a neoclassical theory of
marginal efficiency with an unnamed theory of growth,20 socalled free market reforms have been initiated on the national
and international level supposedly to make markets more
efficient. Nevertheless, as markets have globalized and allegedly
become more efficient, unutilized productive capacity of the
world’s major corporations has, in the eyes of many people,
paradoxically increased rather than decreased. The neoclassical,
generic solution of simply “deregulating” markets, without regard
for the remaining regulated, protected, institutional advantages
of private property that enrich some while excluding others, is,
therefore, suspect in this context.
According to Keynesian analysis, there is indeed persistent
unutilized productive capacity that belies the neoclassical
assumptions of near-perfect efficiency.
Untapped growth
potential and underemployment of labor and capital persist
despite classical and neoclassical economic theory to the
contrary.21 Markets are far from perfectly competitive, and their
operation results in a persistent shortfall in “effective demand.”22
“The result is an endemic underutilization of people and
resources that can, at least, be partially corrected by government
action.”23 But, in addressing unutilized productive capacity, the
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See PAUL DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMIC THEORY: A
FOUNDATION FOR SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 6–8 (1994) (observing that Keynes argued that neoclassical economic
theories could not account for the persistent unemployment rates of the Great
Depression).
22 See generally KEYNES, supra note 8, 23–34 (defining “effective demand”).
23 Ashford, Binary
Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1565.
20
21
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Keynesian analysis attaches no special significance to the
distribution of capital ownership. Indeed, Keynes specifically
says that in understanding his approach,
It is preferable to regard labour, including, of course, the
personal services of the entrepreneur and his assistants, as the
sole factor of production, operating in a given environment of
technique, natural resources, capital equipment and effective
demand. This partly explains why we have been able to take
the unit of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in
our economic system, apart from units of money and of time.24

Accordingly, Keynesian analysis attaches no fundamental
significance to the distribution of capital ownership because in
Keynes’s model, capital earns no independent income and has no
value apart from labor. (Consequently, Keynesian analysis
attaches no fundamental importance to extending to all people
the competitive right to acquire capital with the earnings of
capital.) Further, the Keynesian analysis makes no fundamental
distinction between the distribution and redistribution of income
and capital. In light of the law of private property, however,
lawyers should be skeptical of an analysis that makes no
distinction between the distribution and redistribution of capital
and income.25
Moreover, although Keynesian strategies remain a central
element in the workings of every major economy (witness, for
example the vast public expenditures in the United States),
many if not most people would say that unutilized productive
capacity persists and is apparently growing in the United States
and most industrial economies. Thus, although Keynesian
economics is intended to address and remedy the problem of
unutilized productive capacity, there is reason to doubt its
efficacy with regard to holistic UPC.
For those who recognize its existence, unutilized productive
capacity is an important economic phenomenon that mainstream
economic theory has failed to adequately explain or remedy.
Theoretically, the persistence of unutilized capacity challenges
24 KEYNES,
supra note 8, at 213–14. See generally JOHN FENDER,
UNDERSTANDING KEYNES: AN ANALYSIS OF ‘THE GENERAL THEORY’ (1981).
25 Note that the Keynesian approach is not in harmony with the law of private
property, which sees capital and labor as independent earners, and which
necessarily distinguishes between the distribution and redistribution of income and
capital. See Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1541.
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the foundation of mainstream economics. A major aspect of the
political, social, and moral debate in Western societies regarding
economic policy is related to the employment of productive
capacity, both utilized and unutilized. The economic and political
prospects for greater and more broadly shared prosperity for
women, people of color, and poor and working people are limited
by mainstream understanding of policies related to utilized and
unutilized productive capacity. It would serve the interest of
economically disadvantaged people if they and their counsel
could discover and advance an approach to unutilized productive
capacity that better serves their interests.
When accepted mainstream theories fail to adequately
explain or remedy an important phenomenon, one scientific and
lawyerly way to discover better theories is to identify and
suspend one or more of the assumptions that those theories share
in common and then to explore the counter assumptions and
their implications. Although they differ in many respects, all
mainstream approaches to unutilized productive capacity share
two basic assumptions: (1) the primary role of capital is to make
labor more productive and (2) there is no substantial,
fundamental, positive relationship between the distribution of
capital acquisition and the employment of unutilized capacity
and growth.
By suspending these mainstream economic
assumptions, one is led to two basic premises of binary
economics.
IV. THE BINARY HYPOTHESIS REGARDING UNUTILIZED
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
Binary economics provides a new understanding and
suggests new strategies regarding the persistence of vast, and
many would say growing, unutilized productive capacity in
markets that are supposedly becoming more competitive and
efficient. Particularly noteworthy is the unutilized productive
capacity of the assets owned by major prime credit-worthy public
corporations. As a matter of policy, this is where an enlightened
approach to corporate economic policy can have its greatest
beneficial impact on industry, corporate and shareholder wealth,
people of color, women, and generally people who own little or no
capital.
As previously noted, looking at the question holistically over
a period of time required of fiduciaries, binary economists
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maintain that unutilized capacity is not merely a static ratio of
existing unutilized capital and labor divided by available capital
and labor, but also includes the unutilized capacity to create even
more unutilized productive capacity.
Noting that present
demand for capital investment is dependent on demand for
consumer goods in a future period,26 binary economists reason
that a voluntary pattern of steadily broadening ownership
promises more production-based consumer demand in future
years and, therefore, more demand for capital investment in
earlier years. Thus, a broader distribution of capital acquisition,
ownership, and income strengthens the promise of capital to pay
for itself out of its future earnings, increases the rate of capital
cost recovery, and makes profitable the employment of more, and
increasingly more productive, capital along with the labor
necessary to build, deliver, install, and operate it.
Thus, by relaxing the unproven assumption of mainstream
economics (that a broader pattern of capital acquisition has no
potent, positive, distributive relationship to the profitable
employment of unutilized capacity and the promotion of growth),
the contrary binary assumption (that a broader pattern of capital
acquisition has a potent, positive, distributive relationship to the
profitable employment of unutilized capacity and the promotion
of growth) provides an alternative explanation for much
unutilized productive capacity.
In other words, the binary hypothesis is that much
unutilized productive capacity is the consequence of concentrated
capital ownership. Concentrated capital ownership fails to
distribute broadly the consumer demand necessary to purchase
the output of increasingly capital-intensive production.
Concentrated ownership in turn is the consequence of faulty
market institutions and practices that:
(1) effectively exclude most people from the process of
acquiring capital with the earnings of capital, and
(2) thereby monopolize and suppress the true productive
capacity of capital, by preventing capital from
(a) being acquired more broadly and rapidly, and
(b) thereafter distributing to consumers the income to
purchase what can increasingly be produced by
capital.
26

(1935).

See generally HAROLD G. MOULTON, THE FORMATION OF CAPITAL 37–48
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According to binary theory, if markets were structured to
diffuse ownership voluntarily by enabling all people to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital, then within the timeframe of
capital investment projections of major U.S. corporations (usually
five years) increasing consumer demand (more widely distributed
through the broader acquisition of productive capital with the
earnings of capital) will profitably employ more unutilized
productive capacity and produce more growth.
For example, within a period of perhaps five to fourteen
years, if members of the poor and middle classes are enabled to
compete with existing owners for the acquisition of corporate
shares representing the capital requirements of companies
worthy of prime credit, these poor and middle class people would
bring to the corporate finance bargaining table a chip not
possessed by existing owners: a pent up appetite for more of the
necessities and simple luxuries of life that richer people enjoy.
After the capital has paid for itself, the earnings of capital
acquired by members of the poor and middle class, if paid to
them, will distribute more consumer demand than if that capital
had been acquired by the wealthy. If that capital had been
acquired by existing owners, its income would have been courted
for additional investment, but in the context of less consumer
demand. Compared to the investment opportunities that would
have existed without the prospect of a broader pattern of capital
acquisition, the broader market distribution of capital acquisition
and income generated in a binary economy will create greater
investment opportunities for existing owners as well as for the
new binary owners.
Therefore, mainstream economic theory can be enhanced by
considering the return on capital not only as a function of its
scarcity, the wage rate, and the interest rate, but also as a
function of the increasing productiveness of capital and the
distribution of its ownership. The resultant distribution-based
(binary) growth is not caused by increased human productivity,
capital deepening, or accelerated technological advance. It is
specifically the result of the broader distribution of capital
acquisition. This distribution-based relationship to the rate of
return on capital and growth is not revealed by classical and
neoclassical analyses which assume that the return on capital is
a function of only its scarcity and labor productivity. Likewise,
Keynesian analysis, which reduces the operation of the economy
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to time, money, and labor, cannot yield a conclusion that growth
and the return on capital are independent functions of the
productiveness capital and the distribution of its ownership.
With its labor-based, productivity analysis, mainstream
economic strategies rely on policies that facilitate capital
acquisition primarily for well-capitalized people and jobs and
welfare for everyone else. But binary analysis indicates that jobs
and welfare alone cannot distribute sufficient consumer income
to employ existing unutilized capacity and promote sustainable
growth without the additional consumer income which would
naturally result from the increased productiveness of capital and
a broader pattern of capital acquisition.
V. APPLYING BINARY PRINCIPLES TO THE UNITED STATES
ECONOMY
The logic underlying the principle of binary growth (i.e.,
capital-ownership distribution-based growth) can be understood
and implemented by considering the three thousand largest
companies in the United States, and then focusing on a subset
comprised of prime credit-worthy companies. Most of these
companies exhibit the frustrating essence of unutilized
productive capacity. At diminishing unit costs, they can produce
much more of the goods and services people dearly need and
want. However, the consumer spending power to render more
production profitable even at diminishing unit costs is lacking.
As noted above, presently, almost all new capital is acquired
with the earnings of capital, and much of it is acquired with
borrowed money. The ownership of this corporate wealth is
highly concentrated so that approximately 1% of the people own
40–50% of the wealth and 10% own 90% of the wealth, leaving
90% of people owning little or none. Thus, capital returns its
value at a rate reflective of its long-term (suppressed) earning
capacity as it buys itself for a small minority of the population.27
If the techniques presently used to enable existing owners to
acquire capital with earnings of capital were opened
competitively to all people, then in an economy with
underutilized productive capacity, the demand for capital
investment would increase as its income is increasingly
27 Wolff, How the Pie Is Sliced, supra note 5. See generally WOLFF, TOP HEAVY,
supra note 5 (discussing the disparate increase in wealth along class lines).
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distributed to would-be consumers with unsatisfied needs and
wants. The binary growth potential in this situation can be
understood as a manifestation of the law of supply and demand
within a “binary timeframe”—the time expected for wellmanaged capital to pay for its acquisition costs (a period usually
no longer than five to seven years) and then to begin earning a
net income for its owners. This is a time period in which
technology, capital investment, and the distribution of ownership
are variable rather than fixed. Because demand for capital goods
is dependent on anticipated demand for consumer goods in a
future period, the broader pattern of capital acquisition in a
binary economy will structure more production-based consumer
demand in the future period, and will therefore provide market
incentive for more capital investment in the earlier period.
Admittedly, there would be a gestation period (a period
somewhat shorter than the capital cost recovery period and
determined by the horizon for capital investment planning)
before the distributional growth effects would become noticeable,
but as will be explained, their cumulative effect over time may be
remarkably significant.
As previously noted, to acquire capital with the earnings of
capital, well-capitalized people use: (1) the pre-tax earnings of
capital, (2) collateral, (3) credit, (4) market and insurance
mechanisms to diversify and reduce risk, and (5) a monetary
policy intended to protect private property.
The same
institutions and practices that work profitably for wellcapitalized people can also work profitably for all people. In an
economy operating at less than full capacity, if capital can
competitively pay for its acquisition costs out of its future
earnings primarily for existing owners, it can do so even more
profitably if all people are included in the acquisition process.
Accordingly, to enable all people and major prime creditworthy corporations to capitalize on the potent distributive
relationship between voluntary ownership-broadening capital
acquisition and growth, a binary economy requires only modest
reforms to open the market infrastructure governing corporate
finance so that all people, not merely a minority of the people, are
vested with competitive capital acquisition rights to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital.
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A. A Model of a Binary Economy
The dynamic operation of a binary economy can be modeled
with six basic institutions:
(1) Prime Credit-Worthy
Corporations, (2) Capital Ownership-Broadening Trusts, (3)
Banks, (4) Private Capital Credit Insurers, (5) the Capital
Diffusion Reinsurance Corporation (the only new entity, modeled
after the Federal Housing Administration), and (6) the Federal
Reserve. Figure 1 shows an ownership-broadening “binary
financing” transaction consummated with the voluntary
participation of each of these entities. Figure 1 may be seen as a
single binary financing transaction or the aggregate
representation of all such transactions.
In a binary economy, in addition to their usual means of
acquiring capital assets (borrowing, retained earnings, and sale
of shares), prime credit-worthy corporations could raise the funds
to acquire capital assets by selling special full-dividend common
shares to a Capital Ownership-Broadening Trust for the benefit
of employees, customers, neighbors, and others, paid for with a
bank loan to the Trust, insured by a private capital credit insurer
and government reinsurer, and discounted at a rate of 99.75% by
the Federal Reserve (with 1/4 of one percent reflecting its
estimated administrative cost). Once the capital acquisition loan
repayment obligations are met, the full net capital earnings (net
of reserves for depreciation, research, and development) would be
paid to the binary owners to help them meet their needs and
wants and to provide the basis for increased investment,
employment, and production.28

28 The full payout of capital earnings (net of reserves for depreciation, research,
and development) is essential to enable poor and working people to acquire capital
with the earnings. If the capital earnings of poor and working people are taxed or
retained by the corporation, the capital will not be able to repay its acquisition cost
at a competitive rate and will not distribute needed income to provide for their needs
and support sustained growth.
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General Theory Diagram

Figure 1
B. The Cost of Financing to Participating Corporations and the
Binary Owners
Based on the profitable capital credit experience of the
Federal Housing Administration, the customary bankers spread,
and the estimated administrative costs of Federal Reserve
discounting, the combined cost of binary financing to the
corporation and the beneficiaries will not, under most economic
circumstances, exceed the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Capital Credit Insurance
Customary Banker Spread
Federal Reserve Discount
Total

2%
1–2%
0.25%
3.25–4.25%

The reason underlying the low cost of financing rate is that
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monetized credit does not use existing financial savings as the
source of the loan and therefore does not require compensation
for their use. The estimated cost of capital credit insurance
might be questioned, but it could even be doubled and still
provide a competitive cost of financing in many instances.
C. Binary Growth in a Binary Timeframe
Figure 2 illustrates the distributive, growth-sustaining
feature of an ownership-broadening binary economy.
For
simplicity, Figure 2 assumes a seven-year cost recovery period for
capital investment. It shows the number of years of annual
acquisitions that will have paid for themselves over time. The
figure assumes that in every year after the implementation of the
binary economy, some number, N, of an economy’s largest prime
credit-worthy companies voluntarily have profitably utilized
binary financing to acquire in the aggregate some percentage, X,
of their capital investments. Figure 2 also assumes that the
capital credit insurance is properly priced to pay for those
financings that fail to repay the acquisition loans so that N and X
are net of those failures. For simplicity, as a first iteration, the
figure also assumes that N, X, and the rate of return on capital
remain constant throughout the period.
Although beginning slowly, the broadening distribution of
capital ownership and income will increase steadily and thereby
provide the basis for binary growth. Each year after the initial
cost recovery period of the most productive capital, more binary
capital will have paid for itself and will be distributing capital
income to members of the poor and middle class. Consistent with
the conservative assumption of a seven-year capital cost recovery
period, Figure 2 shows the steady growth in the number of fully
paid annual capital acquisitions. In the eighth year, the first
annual acquisition of capital will have paid for itself and will
begin paying its full return to the new binary owners. In the
ninth year, the second annual capital acquisition will be fully
paid for and will therefore begin paying its full return to the new
binary owners. In fourteen years, 50% of the annual capital
acquisitions will have paid for themselves, and will have begun
paying their full annual return to the new binary owners. In the
twenty-eighth year, 75% of the acquisitions will have paid for
themselves; and so on. In the long run, the linkage between
supply (in the form of the incremental productive power of
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capital) and demand (resulting from the widespread market
distribution of capital income to consumers) approaches 100%.
The more binary financing that is undertaken, the greater the
distributional growth effects.
With the prospect of more broadly distributed capital
income, to maintain market share in the projected growing
economy, producers will have to increase production and
productive capacity by more fully utilizing existing capacity and
creating more capacity. Because present demand for capital
goods is dependent on the anticipation of more future demand for
consumer goods and services, the broader pattern of capital
acquisition and resultant broader distribution of capital income
should be reflected in increased capital spending within the
timeframe required to acquire and employ the added capital
necessary to increase production to satisfy the additional
anticipated consumer demand. Thus, for example, with a capital
cost recovery period of seven years, and a capital planning
investment horizon of five years, increased incentives for
increased capital spending might materialize in the third year.
Percent of Binary Capital Acquisitions that Fully Link Supply
with Demand
100%
83.4%

85.7%

88.7%

89.9%

90%

56

63

70

80%

80%

75%

66.7%

60%
50%

40%

20%

0

0%

0%

0

7

14

21

28

35

42

49

Figure 2
Indeed, the incentives for increased capital investment might
start even earlier. First, to the extent that the return on the
equity represented by the binary shares exceeds the debtservicing requirements, income will be available for payment to
the binary beneficiaries before completion of the capital recovery.
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Second, to the extent that consumers feel wealthier by reason of
their capital ownership, their marginal savings and consumption
rates will shift towards more consumption even before they begin
to receive binary income. Furthermore, the terms of the loan
agreements may provide for increasing partial dividend
payments directly to the beneficial owners as specified
percentages of the loans and shares become fully paid.
The broader distribution of capital ownership also has the
capacity to reduce the need for taxes on corporations and
individuals. In light of government expenditures and taxtransfer payments that are made to provide benefits to people
who cannot afford those benefits (based on their labor earnings),
to the extent that those people begin to receive income from
capital (after it has paid for its acquisition costs) the
government’s direct expenditures and tax-transfer payments can
be reduced. For example, if people who are receiving tax-transfer
payments begin receiving capital income, the government can
partially reduce future tax-transfer payments and give a tax
credit in the following year to the corporation whose shares are
earning that income for welfare recipients. Thus, an economy
that provides public corporations with a voluntary, ownershipbroadening means to enable people to acquire capital with the
earnings of capital also provides a long-term means to reduce
taxes, welfare dependence, and deficits.
Moreover, to the extent that welfare recipients begin
receiving capital income from the shares they have acquired with
the earnings of capital, it would not be proper to call that income
“redistribution,” because such income exists only to the extent
that their capital has paid for itself and then earned net income
(after paying all operating expenses, plus reserves for
depreciation, research, and development).
From a binary
perspective, the incremental binary consumer income is neither
inflationary nor redistributionary because it exists only as a
result of voluntary transactions, and only if the underlying
capital has produced goods or services sufficient, first, to return
its acquisition cost, and then to pay net income to its owners.
The greater and more broadly distributed wealth is the result of
increased production as a market response to the broader pattern
of capital acquisition.29
29

See Ashford, The Promise of Universal Capitalism, supra note 2, at 63-76, 79-
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VI. ADVOCACY IN SUPPORT OF BINARY PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR
WOMEN AND PEOPLE OF COLOR
To acquire capital with the earnings of capital, public
corporations and well-capitalized people use the pre-tax earnings
of capital,30 non-recourse corporate credit, insurance and markets
to cover risks of business failure, and a friendly monetary policy
designed to protect private property. Binary analysis reveals
that the same institutions of capitalism that work profitably
primarily for the few can be opened to work even more profitably
if all people are endowed with competitive capital acquisition
rights. Operating without taking anything from existing owners,
these institutions could be opened to provide the financial
infrastructure to enable corporations to satisfy their creditworthy capital requirements even more profitably than at
present while enabling their employees, consumers, neighbors,
and other stakeholders to acquire full-dividend paying common
shares of the participating corporations.
Broadening the right to acquire capital with the earnings of
capital is an important issue of interest-convergence among the
vast majority of people of color, women, poor and working people,
and public corporations.31 The convergent interest is to open the
system of corporate finance to broaden capital acquisition so as to
provide the foundation for (1) increasingly widespread prosperity
for people who own little or no capital and (2) a growing economy
in which public corporations can increasingly employ their
productive capacity more fully and profitably.
Through the years, many compassion and justice based
87; Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy, supra note 2, at 39-41; Ashford, Binary
Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 2, at
1532. See generally ASHFORD & SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2.
30 Operating on a foundation of legislation and regulation, well-capitalized
people enjoy reserves for depreciation, research and development, and tax credits,
which enable owners to replace and modernize their capital and acquire additional
capital with the pre-tax earnings of capital. These benefits that enable people to
acquire capital with the pre-tax earnings of capital are largely denied to most people
who own little or no capital. A laborer cannot depreciate the value of his earning
capacity over her working life, but an owner can depreciate the cost of a machine
that replaces her. By working to minimize taxable corporate and personal income
while maximizing credits and deductions, tax accountants, advisors, and lawyers
work to maximize the ability of owners to acquire capital with the pre-tax earnings
of capital. Working pro-bono, the same professionals can work to secure the identical
capital acquisition rights of people who own little or no capital.
31 See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 523 (1980).
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initiatives to help economically disadvantaged people have failed
to meet their objectives because of resistance to redistribution.
This resistance is based in part on a widely expressed, practical
concern, fortified by mainstream economic theory, that
redistribution will, or may, destroy incentives for productive
activity. This resistance also has a moral dimension based on the
belief that assisting the economically disadvantaged should be
voluntary rather than compulsory.
Not surprisingly, this
resistance to redistribution frequently finds some of its most
ardent expression from among those whose assets are being (or
would be) redistributed against their will. Many attorneys for
the economically disadvantaged would concede that the antiredistribution sentiment is a powerful obstacle to such
initiatives. But the binary approach, based on universalizing the
right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital, does not
require any redistribution of existing assets, but rather merely
the opening of the capital markets to all people.
The fact that binary growth does not require redistribution
makes it an especially powerful approach for economically
advantaged people in many contexts. In the debate regarding
Black reparations, for example, a major impediment to progress
has been a widely advanced argument that it is wrong to require
the present generation (many of whose ancestors were also the
victims of exploitation, oppression, and genocide in other
countries) to pay for the wrongs of the past for which they have
no complicity. Noting that the extension of binary rights
requires no redistribution, Professor Anthony Cook has
eloquently endorsed the binary approach and advanced its
application as a means to achieve just reparations for the
institution of slavery, without redistribution, by according to the
descendants of slaves priority in the process by which the binary
property right is extended to the economically disadvantaged.32
In Professor Cook’s view, the inclusive, binary approach is in
harmony with the approach of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King
in calling for the “beloved community.”33
Bearing in mind that the duties of corporate fiduciaries flow
first to the corporation and secondarily to the shareholders,34
32 See Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian
Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 999–1014 (2000).
33 Id. at 1013–14.
34 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
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attorneys for women and people of color should join with
attorneys for the economically disadvantaged, consumers,
employees and their retirement plans, and other stakeholders.
Together they should approach corporate counsel and urge them,
within the bounds of their fiduciary responsibilities, to explore
and advise their corporate clients of the substantial benefits to
corporations and society of the binary ownership-broadening
approach to corporate finance.35
The principles of binary economics thus suggest that public
corporations have an inherent interest in considering ways to
broaden their share ownership. These principles reveal a little
understood opportunity for public corporations to enhance their
wealth substantially over time by working in concert to open the
existing system of corporate finance to enable their employees,
consumers, neighbors, and others to acquire capital with the
earnings of capital.
According to binary theory, the more broadly capital is
acquired in voluntary market transactions, the faster an
economy, and large corporations within that economy, will grow.
More broadly distributed capital acquisition will:
(1) distribute more consumer demand, thereby enhancing
the market for good and services;
(2) profitably employ more unutilized capacity (both
capital and labor);
(3) increase capital investment;
(4) accelerate technological advance;
(5) enhance employee productivity, consumer loyalty, and
general goodwill among neighbors of participating
companies and the general population;
(6) reduce the need for taxation, other forms of
redistribution, and associated transactions costs;
(7) enhance general wealth of most major corporations,
their shareholders, and the general population;
(8) broaden, deepen, and more fully democratize the
institution of private property by opening its benefits to
more people; and
(9) strengthen political democracy by opening capital
acquisition with the earnings of capital to more people.36
CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983).
35 See Ashford, supra note 3; Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and
Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1575–77.
36 See Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social
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Of course, as to some of these benefits, there may be a socalled “collective action problem”: no single corporation can be
assured of maintaining its share of the overall growth. For
example, people encapitalized by one producer may use their
additional capital income to buy products of a competitor that
has no participation in the binary financing; but as a matter of
corporate interest, it is generally better to compete for market
share of a faster growing economy than a slower growing,
stagnant, or shrinking one.
Moreover, not all of the benefits of binary financing are
subject to the collective action problem. For example, financing
at least a portion of its capital acquisition by way of the binary
ownership-broadening alternative has promise to benefit a
corporation by encapitalizing:
(1) employees (by increasing worker productivity and
commitment to the welfare of their employer, and by
decreasing pilferage, absenteeism, and monitoring costs);
(2) consumers of the corporation’s product (witness the
rationale underlying existing frequent flier programs and
other consumer-patronage plans);
(3) neighbors (with most major corporations owning
facilities generally surrounded by poor and working
people living nearby, there is the prospect of reduced
vandalism and security costs, and better relations with
local governments); and
(4) welfare recipients (as noted above, a corporation that
encapitalizes welfare recipients can be given tax credits
equal to all or a portion of the transfer payments that are
replaced in any year with capital income that is earned
from the corporation’s shares and distributed to the
welfare recipients based on their share ownership).
Given the interest of public corporations in enhancing their
wealth and profitability, corporate fiduciaries and counsel may
not, consistent with their fiduciary duties, simply ignore the
binary arguments that indicate that broadening corporate share
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1539. The importance of widespread ownership to
democracy received special attention in KELSO & KELSO, supra note 2. Many binary
economists believe that the vast majority of people are denied equal protection
because they are substantially excluded from government-provided legal protections
by which capital markets function to enable well-capitalized people to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital. See Ashford, The Promise of Universal
Capitalism, supra note 2, at 99–101; Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties,
and Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1571–73.
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ownership will achieve these objectives. Rather, due diligence
requires a careful, good faith assessment of the likely effect on
corporate profitability and corporate wealth that would result
from encapitalizing employees, consumers, neighbors, and
welfare recipients by way of binary strategies.
Of course, not all shareholders would favor a binary policy of
encapitalizing corporate employees, consumers, neighbors, and
welfare recipients even if that policy would enhance corporate
profitability and wealth. Like other monopolists, those who are
members of a group that together enjoy an effective monopoly on
capital acquisition with the earnings of capital may prefer slower
growth, provided they acquire it all, to greater growth if it must
be shared with others. Some existing shareholders may prefer to
own a larger portion of a smaller, less profitable corporation than
a smaller portion of a larger, more profitable corporation even if
in material terms they would be better off with the smaller
portion of the larger, more profitable corporation. But there is no
reason to assume that all shareholders would be so stingy. Many
shareholders might prefer the binary ownership alternative if
they were presented with and understood the arguments
supporting it. If the binary approach to capital acquisition would
benefit the corporation, at least shareholders should be presented
the arguments supporting it and given the choice. Directors owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation to present profitable corporate
opportunities to all the shareholders even if some would oppose
it.
CONCLUSION
Binary economics offers an opportunity beyond mainstream
thinking for helping the vast majority of women and people of
color. It provides important insights regarding the persistence of
widespread unmet needs and desires of billions of people
alongside the unutilized productive capacity to meet more fully
those needs and desires. It also reveals opportunities for
achieving enhanced corporate profitability and growth and more
broadly shared economic prosperity by way of voluntary,
ownership-broadening market transactions.
According to binary theory, the right to acquire capital with
the earnings can be extended to growing numbers, and
eventually to all people, without redistribution. This inclusive,
enriching approach to corporate finance can be achieved with
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only modest modifications of the existing system, and its
achievement can be greatly hastened if law teachers and lawyers
come to see its importance for clients and for economic justice.
It would better serve the interest of the vast majority of
most people of color, women, and virtually all people who own
little or no capital if their attorneys and advisors would include
the question of unutilized productive capacity and the subject of
binary economics in their discussions on corporate governance,
fiduciary duties, and social responsibility.
In a context in which persistent and growing underutilized
corporate productive capacity is widely accepted as fact, public
and private concern for the plight of the economically
disadvantaged increases. In such a context, it is not at all clear
that the substantial corporate wealth-enhancing promise of
broadening ownership based on binary theory can simply be
ignored (as it has been in the past) based on the authority of
mainstream economic theories. These theories have failed to
explain or remedy the persistent and growing phenomenon of
unutilized productive capacity of public corporations.
Some people start with the premise that proponents of the
binary approach to corporate finance have a burden of proving
that their proposed reforms have sufficient merit to be
implemented. But fiduciaries must start with the recognition
that they have an independent, affirmative duty of
investigation37—a duty to consider and explore wealth
maximizing opportunities even if the reformers’ burden of proof
has not been met to the satisfaction of economists.
In support of the inclusion of binary economics in the
discussion of corporate governance, fiduciary duties, and social
responsibility, when judged under the scientific criteria of (1)
reasonable assumptions, (2) internal consistency, and (3)
descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive power, the binary
approach fares at least as well if not better than the classical,
neoclassical, and Keynesian economic approaches to unutilized
productive capacity and growth, which are explicitly or implicitly
relied upon by clients and counsel in the discussion of those
topics.
Many counsel for people of color, women, and the

37 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
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economically disadvantaged (who have undertaken to represent
such people regarding their economic interests) frequently
advance labor rights, welfare rights, compensation rights, and
other corporate policies to address inequities and hardships
suffered by their clients. The same is true for many legal
advocacy organizations, foundations, and government agencies
that have as their objective or mandate advocacy and direct
action (1) on behalf of such people and (2) regarding the
improvement of legislation and economic policy so as to enhance
the economic well-being of such people. But very few such
attorneys, organizations, foundations, and agencies advocate the
binary approach that would secure for their clients or intended
beneficiaries the right to acquire capital with the earnings of
capital.38 There is no inherent reason in law to assume such a
limited notion of the responsibility of advocacy. The right to
acquire capital with the earnings of capital is obviously
important to wealthy clients.
(From a binary historical
perspective, one might say that a major reason for the Cold War
was to protect the private right to acquire capital with the
earnings of capital.) Then why should that right be excluded by
attorneys and other advocates who represent the economic
interests of the economically disadvantaged? Attorneys who
represent the economic interests of people of color, women, and
poor and working people should not limit their advocacy to jobs
and welfare, and exclude advocacy regarding the right to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital, unless their clients consent
to such limitation and exclusion after consultation. Valid consent
requires that the clients are given information reasonably
sufficient to permit them to appreciate the significance of the
matter in question.39 Similar ethical considerations should guide
38 A praiseworthy exception is the Center for Economic and Social Justice,
which has for years championed binary economics. See Center for Economic and
Social Justice, http://www.cesj.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2005). A book by three of its
leading members, Norman G. Kurland, Dawn K. Brohawn, and Michael D. Greaney,
CAPITAL HOMESTEADING FOR EVERY CITIZEN: A JUST FREE MARKET SOLUTION FOR
SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY (2004), presents proposed legislation along with a detailed
description of one approach to implementing a binary economy.
39 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (1983) (“A lawyer may limit
the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.”). Id. In
the “Terminology” section of the Model Rules, “Consultation denotes communication
of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the
significance of the matter in question.” Thus, it would seem that counsel for poor and
working people, people of color, and women who have undertaken to advocate for

CP1_ASHFORD

1256

2/6/2006 9:10:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1221

the conduct of other advocates who are not strictly governed by
attorney rules of professional responsibility.
Unfortunately, at present, the vast majority of counsel and
their clients seem wholly unaware that the right to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital might be the subject of
advocacy for people of color, women, and poor and working people
generally. Although the concepts underlying binary economics
were first published almost fifty years ago, generations of
students of law and economics continue to graduate with no
exposure those concepts. Reform of the curriculum in law,
economics, and other disciplines within colleges, universities,
business schools, and law schools is therefore a matter of urgent
concern.
It is true that Louis Kelso, the originator of binary
economics, was not an economist. But neither were Adam Smith
and John Maynard Keynes. Moreover, although the binary
approach is most frequently advanced as an economic theory
(because that is the subject which it most significantly modifies),
unlike the theories of Smith and Keynes, binary theory is
grounded in the private property principles of (1) universal
participation, (2) voluntary exchange, and (3) limitation, all of
which have deep roots in the work of John Locke and the AngloAmerican common law.40
Thus, as a matter of long-standing legal principles, binary
economics offers important insights that women and people of
color and their attorneys would benefit from understanding. It
offers at least one new answer to the two questions that began
this Article: What else can public corporations do for women and
people of color? What else can attorneys for women and people of
color do to serve those clients better? Advocacy of the right to
acquire capital with the earnings of capital should not be
excluded by counsel and advocates in their representation of the
their economic interests would need to provide information about binary economics
and its potential for assisting those clients sufficient to enable them to provide valid
consent to limit the representation so as to exclude advocacy regarding their rights
to acquire capital with the earnings of capital.
40 It is significant to note that the following private property principles are also
necessary conditions for a competitive market: (1) no barriers to entry, (2) voluntary
exchange, and (3) limitations to prevent monopolistic practices. See ASHFORD &
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, at 336–38; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 2, at 23–29;
Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social Responsibility,
supra note 2, at 1569.
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APPENDIX: BINARY ECONOMICS AND TWELVE QUESTIONS FOR
COUNSEL TO WOMEN AND PEOPLE OF COLOR
Often, serving clients well requires that counsel ask the
right question. The following are twelve questions that counsel
for the economically disadvantaged rarely ask.
(1) Why does wealth tend to concentrate in market
economies even in times of great prosperity?
(2) Why, if markets are basically free and competitive, does
vast excess productive capacity persist alongside of widespread
unmet needs and wants?
(3) Why does the great promise of the industrial revolution
(abundance and leisure) remain unfulfilled for most people?
(4) Why does every generation of students graduate deeper
in debt?
(5) Does it matter whether the ownership of capital is highly
concentrated or broadly distributed among people?
(6) What is behind the adage, “It takes money to make
money”?
(7) What are the growth and distributive consequences of
the fact that most capital is acquired with the earnings of
capital?
(8) How can more economic opportunity become more
broadly distributed?
(9) Is there a practical, efficient way to enable all people to
acquire capital with the earnings of capital without taking
anything from existing owners?
(10) Will an opening of the capital markets produce
substantial distribution-based economic growth?
(11) How can the need for increased economic growth to
benefit poor and working people be harmonized with
environmental necessities?
(12) What is the relationship between the distribution of
ownership and the functioning of a democracy?
Binary economics offers important new insights, answers,
and solutions.

